Tag: economics
A Witch’s Parable
Addendum: Oh good grief. This was supposed to go up at the beginning of the week, but something went awry. Alas! Well, it’s up now.
Suppose we live in colonial times, in a town on an archipelago. The islands are individually small and isolated, but their position relative to the prevailing winds and ocean currents mean that different small islands can grow a wide variety of crops that are normally only obtainable by intercontinental trade. The presence of these crops, and good, predictable winds and currents, has made those islands that don’t grow food into world renowned trade hubs, and attracted overseas investment.
With access to capital and a wide variety goods, the archipelago has boomed. Artisans, taking advantage of access to exotic painting supplies, have taken to the islands, and scientists of all stripes have flocked to the archipelago, both to study the exotic flora and fauna, and to set up workshops and universities in this rising world capital. As a result of this local renaissance, denizens of the islands enjoy a quality of life hitherto undreamt of, and matched only in the palaces of Europe.
Still, the HSITC is entrenched in the islands, and few are willing to risk jeopardizing what they’ve accomplished by attempting insurrection. The cramped, aging vessels employed by the HSITC as ferries between the islands pale in comparison to the new, foreign ships that dock at the harbors, and their taxes seem to grow larger each year, but as long as the ferry system continues to function, there is little more than idle complaint.
Shiny
Alright, listen up Pandora, Diamonds International, Tiffany & Co., and other brands of fancy upscale jewelry that I can’t be bothered to recall at this time because I’m a guy. I’m about to talk about an idea that could help you dodge a bullet and get ahead of the next big thing.
Thoughts on Steam
After much back and forth, I finally have a steam account. I caved eventually because I wanted to be able to actually play my brother’s birthday present to me; the game Cities: Skylines and all of its additional downloadable content packs. I had resisted, what has for some time felt inevitably, downloading steam, for a couple of reasons. The first was practical. Our family’s main computer is now reaching close to a decade old, and in its age does not handle all new things gracefully, or at least, does not do so consistently. Some days it will have no problem running multiple CPU-intensive games at once. Other days it promptly keels over when I so much as try to open a document.
Moreover, our internet is terrible. So terrible in fact that its latest speed test results mean that it does not qualify as broadband under any statutory or technical definition, despite paying not only for broadband, but for the highest available tier of it. Allegedly this problem has to do with the geography of our neighborhood and the construction of our house. Apparently, according to our ISP, the same walls which cannot help but share our heating and air conditioning with the outside, and which allow me to hear a whisper on the far side of the house, are totally impermeable to WiFi signals.
This fear was initially confirmed when my download told me that it would only be complete in an estimated two hundred and sixty one days. That is to say, it would take several times longer to download than it would for me to fly to the game developer’s headquarters in Sweden and get a copy on a flash drive. Or even to take a leisurely sea voyage.
This prediction turned out, thankfully, to be wrong. The download took a mere five hours; the vast majority of the progress was made during the last half hour when I was alone in the house. This is still far longer than the fifteen minutes or less that I’m accustomed to when installing from a CD. I suppose I ought to give some slack here, given that I didn’t have to physically go somewhere to purchase the CD.
My other point of contention with steam is philosophical. Steam makes it abundantly clear in their terms and conditions (which, yes, I do read, or at least, glaze over, as a general habit), that when you are paying them money to play games, you aren’t actually buying anything. At no point do you actually own the game that you are nominally purchasing. The legal setup here is terribly complicated, and given its novelty, not crystal clear in its definition and precedence, especially with the variations in jurisdictions that come with operating on the Internet. But while it isn’t clear what Steam is, Steam has made it quite clear what it isn’t. It isn’t selling games.
The idea of not owning the things that one buys isn’t strictly new. Software has never really been for sale in the old sense. You don’t buy Microsoft Word; you buy a license to use a copy of it, even if you were receiving it on a disk that was yours to own. Going back further, while you might own the physical token of a book, you don’t own the words on it inasmuch as it is not yours to copy and sell. This is a consequence of copyright and related concepts of intellectual property, which are intended to assist creators by granting them a temporary monopoly on their creations’ manufacture and sale, so as to incentivize more good creative work.
Yet this last example pulls at a loose thread: I may not own the story, but I do own the book. I may not be allowed to manufacture and sell new copies, but I can dispose of my current copy as I see fit. I can mark it, alter it, even destroy it if I so choose. I can take notes and excerpts from it so long as I am not copying the book wholesale, and I can sell my single copy of the book to another person for whatever price the two of us may agree upon, the same as any other piece of property. Software is not like this, though a strong argument can be made that it is only very recently that this new status quo has become practically enforceable.
Indeed, for as long as software has been sold in stores by means of disks and flash drives, it has been closer to the example of the classic book. For, as long as I have my CD, and whatever authentication key might come with it, I can install the contents wherever I might see fit. Without Internet connectivity to report back on my usage, there is no way of the publisher even knowing whether or not I am using their product, let alone whether I am using it in their intended manner. Microsoft can issue updates and changes, but with my CD and non-connected computer, I can keep my version of their software running how I like it forever.
Steam, however, takes this mindset that has existed in theory to its practical conclusion. You do not own the games that you pay for. This is roughly equivalent to the difference between buying a car, and chartering a limo service. Now, there’s nothing inherently wrong with this approach, but it is a major shift. There is of course the shift in power from consumers to providers: rather than you getting to dispose of your games as you see fit, you can have them revoked by Steam if you misbehave or cheat. This is unnerving, especially to one such as myself who is accustomed to having more freedom with things I buy (that’s why I buy them- to do as I please with), but not as interesting as the larger implications on the notion of property as a whole.
I don’t think the average layman knows or even cares about the particulars of license transfers. Ask such a layman what Steam does, and they’ll probably answer that they sell video games, in the same way that iTunes sells music. The actual minutiae of ownership are a distant second to the point of use. I call my games, and digital music, and the information on my Facebook feed mine, even though I don’t own them by any stretch of the imagination.
This use need not be exclusive either, so long as it never infringes on my own plans. After all, if there were a hypothetical person listening to my music and playing my games only precisely when I’m not, I might never notice.
So far I have referred to mostly digital goods, and sharing as it pertains to intellectual property. But this need not be the case. Ridesharing, for example, is already transforming the idea of owning and chartering a vehicle. On a more technical level, this is how mortgages, banknotes, and savings accounts have worked for centuries, in order to increase the money supply and expand the economy. Modern fiat currency, it will be seen, is not so much a commodity that is discretely owned as one that is shared an assigned value between its holder, society, and the government backing it. This quantum state is what allows credit and debt, which permit modern economies to function and flourish.
This shift in thinking around ownership certainly has the capability to be revolutionary, shifting prices and thinking around these new goods. Whether or not it will remains to be seen. Certainly it remains to be seen whether this change will be a net positive for consumers as well as the economy as a whole.
Cities: Skylines seems to be a fun game that our family computer can just barely manage to play. At the moment, this is all that is important to me. Yet I will be keeping an eye on how, if at all, getting games through steam influencers my enjoyment, for good or for ill.
Bretton Woods
So I realized earlier this week, while staring at the return address stamped on the sign outside the small post office on the lower level of the resort my grandfather selected for us on our family trip, that we were in fact staying in the same hotel which hosted the famous Bretton Woods Conference, that resulted in the Bretton Woods System that governed post-WWII economic rebuilding around the world, and laid the groundwork for our modern economic system, helping to cement the idea of currency as we consider it today.
Needless to say, I find this intensely fascinating; both the conference itself as a gathering of some of the most powerful people at one of the major turning points in history, and the system that resulted from it. Since I can’t recall having spent any time on this subject in my high school economics course, I thought I would go over some of the highlights, along with pictures of the resort that I was able to snap.
First, some background on the conference. The Bretton Woods conference took place in July of 1944, while the Second World War was still in full swing. The allied landings in Normandy, less than a month earlier, had been successful in establishing isolated beachheads, but Operation Overlord as a whole could still fail if British, Canadian, American, and Free French forces were prevented from linking up and liberating Paris.
On the Eastern European front, the Red Army had just begun Operation Bagration, the long planned grand offensive to push Nazi forces out of the Soviet Union entirely, and begin pushing offensively through occupied Eastern Europe and into Germany. Soviet victories would continue to rack up as the conference went on, as the Red Army executed the largest and most successful offensive in its history, escalating political concerns among the western allies about the role the Soviet Union and its newly “liberated” territory could play in a postwar world.
In the pacific, the Battle of Saipan was winding down towards an American victory, radically changing the strategic situation by putting the Japanese homeland in range of American strategic bombing. Even as the battles rage on, more and more leaders on both sides look increasingly to the possibility of an imminent allied victory.
As the specter of rebuilding a world ravaged by the most expensive and most devastating conflict in human history (and hopefully ever) began to seem closer, representatives of all nations in the allied powers met in a resort in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, at the foot of Mount Washington, to discuss the economic future of a postwar world in the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, more commonly referred to as the Bretton Woods Conference. The site was chosen because, in addition to being vacant (since the war had effectively killed tourism), the isolation of the surrounding mountains made the site suitably defensible against any sort of attack. It was hoped that this show of hospitality and safety would assuage delegates coming from war torn and occupied parts of the world.
After being told that the hotel had only 200-odd rooms for a conference of 700-odd delegates, most delegates, naturally, decided to bring their families, an many cases bringing as many extended relatives as could be admitted on diplomatic credentials. Of course, this was probably as much about escaping the ongoing horrors in Europe and Asia as it was getting a free resort vacation.
As such, every bed within a 22 mile radius was occupied. Staff were forced out of their quarters and relocated to the stable barns to make room for delegates. Even then, guests were sleeping in chairs, bathtubs, even on the floors of the conference rooms themselves.
The conference was attended by such illustrious figures as John Maynard Keynes (yes, that Keynes) and Harry Dexter White (who, in addition to being the lead American delegate, was also almost certainly a spy for the Soviet NKVD, the forerunner to the KGB), who clashed on what, fundamentally, should be the aim of the allies to establish in a postwar economic order.
Everyone agreed that protectionist, mercantilist, and “economic nationalist” policies of the interwar period had contributed both to the utter collapse of the Great Depression, and the collapse of European markets, which created the socioeconomic conditions for the rise of fascism. Everyone agreed that punitive reparations placed on Germany after WWI had set up European governments for a cascade of defaults and collapses when Germany inevitably failed to pay up, and turned to playing fast and loose with its currency and trade policies to adhere to the letter of the Treaty of Versailles.
It was also agreed that even if reparations were entirely done away with, which would leave allied nations such as France, and the British commonwealth bankrupt for their noble efforts, that the sheer upfront cost of rebuilding would be nigh impossible by normal economic means, and that leaving the task of rebuilding entire continents would inevitably lead to the same kind of zero-sum competition and unsound monetary policy that had led to the prewar economic collapse in the first place. It was decided, then, that the only way to ensure economic stability through the period of rebuilding was to enforce universal trade policies, and to institute a number of centralized financial organizations under the purview of the United Nations, to oversee postwar rebuilding and monetary policy.
The devil was in the details, however. The United States, having spent the war safe from serious economic infrastructure damage, serving as the “arsenal of democracy”, and generally being the only country that had reserves of capital, wanted to use its position of relative economic supremacy to gain permanent leverage. As the host of the conference and the de-facto lead for the western allies, the US held a great deal of negotiating power, and the US delegates fully intended to use it to see that the new world order would be one friendly to American interests.
Moreover, the US, and to a lesser degree, the United Kingdom, wanted to do as much as possible to prevent the Soviet Union from coming to dominate the world after it rebuilt itself. As World War II was beginning to wind down, the Cold War was beginning to wind up. To this end, the news of daily Soviet advances, first pushing the Nazis out of its borders, and then steamrolling into Poland, Finland, and the Baltics was troubling. Even more troubling were the rumors of the ruthless NKVD suppression of non-communist partisan groups that had resisted Nazi occupation in Eastern Europe, indicating that the Soviets might be looking to establish their own postwar hegemony.
The first major set piece of the conference agreement was relatively uncontroversial: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, drafted by Keynes and his committee, was established to offer grants and loans to countries recovering from the war. As an independent institution, it was hoped that the IBRD would offer flexibility to rebuilding nations that loans from other governments with their own financial and political obligations and interests could not. This was also a precursor to, and later backbone of, the Marshal Plan, in which the US would spend exorbitant amounts on foreign aid to rebuild capitalism in Europe and Asia in order to prevent the rise of communist movements fueled by lack of opportunity.
The second major set piece is where things get really complicated. I’m massively oversimplifying here, but global macroeconomic policy is inevitably complicated in places. The second major set-piece, a proposed “International Clearing Union” devised by Keynes back in 1941, was far more controversial.
The plan, as best I am able to understand it, called for all international trade to be handled through a single centralized institution, which would measure the value of all other goods and currencies relative to a standard unit, tentatively called a “bancor”. The ICU would then offer incentives to maintain trade balances relative to the size of a nation’s economy, by charging interest off of countries with a major trade surplus, and using the excess to devalue the exchange rates of countries with trade deficits, making imports more expensive and products more desirable to overseas consumers.
The Grand Ballroom was thrown into fierce debate, and the local Boy Scouts that had been conscripted to run microphones between delegates (most of the normal staff either having been drafted, or completely overloaded) struggled to keep up with these giants of economics and diplomacy.
Unsurprisingly, the US delegate, White, was absolutely against Keynes’s hair brained scheme. Instead, he proposed a far less ambitious “International Monetary Fund”, which would judge trade balances, and prescribe limits for nations seeking aid from the IMF or IBRD, but otherwise would generally avoid intervening. The IMF did keep Keynes’s idea of judging trade based on a pre-set exchange rate (also obligatory for members), but avoided handing over the power to unilaterally affect the value of individual currencies to the IMF, instead leaving it in the hands of national governments, and merely insisting on certain requirements for aid and membership. It also did away with notions of an ultranational currency.
Of course, this raised the question of how to judge currency values other than against each other alone (which was still seen as a bridge too far in the eyes of many). The solution, proposed by White, was simple: judge other currencies against the US dollar. After all, the United States was already the largest and most developed economy. And since other countries had spent the duration of the war buying materiel from the US, it also held the world’s largest reserves of almost every currency, including gold and silver, and sovereign debt. The US was the only country to come out of WWII with enough gold in reserve to stay on the gold standard and also finance postwar rebuilding, which made it a perfect candidate as a default currency.
Now, you can see this move either as a sensible compromise for a world of countries that couldn’t have gone back to their old ways if they tried, or as a master stroke attempt by the US government to cement its supremacy at the beginning of the Cold War. Either way, it worked as a solution, both in the short term, and in the long term, creating a perfect balance of stability and flexibility in monetary policy for a postwar economic boom, not just in the US, but throughout the capitalist world.
The third set piece was a proposed “International Trade Organization”, which was to oversee implementation and enforcement of the sort of universal free trade policies that almost everyone agreed would be most conducive not only to prosperity, but to peace as a whole. Perhaps surprisingly, this wasn’t terribly divisive at the conference.
The final agreement for the ITO, however, was eventually shot down when the US Senate refused to ratify its charter, partly because the final conference had been administered in Havana under Keynes, who used the opportunity to incorporate many of his earlier ideas on an International Clearing Union. Much of the basic policies of the ITO, however, influenced the successful General Agreements on Tarriffs and Trade, which would later be replaced by the World Trade Organization.
The Bretton Woods agreement was signed by the allied delegates in the resort’s Gold Room. Not all countries that signed immediately ratified. The Soviet Union, perhaps unsurprisingly, reversed its position on the agreement, calling the new international organizations “a branch of Wall Street”, going on to found the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, a forerunner to the Warsaw Pact, within five years. The British Empire, particularly its overseas possessions, also took time in ratifying, owing to the longstanding colonial trade policies that had to be dismantled in order for free trade requirements to be met.
The consensus of most economists is that Bretton Woods was a success. The system more or less ceased to exist when Nixon, prompted by Cold War drains on US resources, and French schemes to exchange all of its reserve US dollars for gold, suspended the Gold Standard for the US dollar, effectively ushering in the age of free-floating fiat currencies; that is, money that has value because we all collectively accept that it does; an assumption that underlies most of our modern economic thinking.
While it certainly didn’t last forever, the Bretton Woods system did accomplish its primary goal of setting the groundwork for a stable world economy, capable of rebuilding and maintaining the peace. This is a pretty lofty achievement when one considers the background against which the conference took place, the vast differences between the players, and the general uncertainty about the future.
The vision set forth in the Bretton Woods Conference was an incredibly optimistic, even idealistic, one. It’s easy to scoff at the idea of hammering out an entire global economic system, in less than a month, at a backwoods hotel in the White Mountains, but I think it speaks to the intense optimism and hope for the future that is often left out of the narrative of those dark moments. The belief that we can, out of chaos and despair, forge a brighter future not just for ourselves, but for all, is not in itself crazy, and the relative success of the Bretton Woods System, flawed though it certainly was, speaks to that.
Works Consulted
IMF. “60th Anniversary of Bretton Woods.” 60th Anniversary – Background Information, what is the Bretton Woods Conference. International Monetary Fund, n.d. Web. 10 Aug. 2017. <http://external.worldbankimflib.org/Bwf/whatisbw.htm>.
“Cooperation and Reconstruction (1944-71).” About the IMF: History. International Monetary Fund, n.d. Web. 10 Aug. 2017. <http://www.imf.org/external/about/histcoop.htm>
YouTube. Extra Credits, n.d. Web. 10 Aug. 2017. <http://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLhyKYa0YJ_5CL-krstYn532QY1Ayo27s1>.
Burant, Stephen R. East Germany, a country study. Washington, D.C.: The Division, 1988. Library of Congress. Web. 10 Aug. 2017. <https://archive.org/details/eastgermanycount00bura_0>.
US Department of State. “Proceedings and Documents of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1-22, 1944.” Proceedings and Documents of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1-22, 1944 – FRASER – St. Louis Fed. N.p., n.d. Web. 10 Aug. 2017. <https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/430>.
Additional information provided by resort staff and exhibitions visitited in person.